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1TheSwingtoward Wealth Estimates
A few years ago, national wealth estimates were in disrepute—
largely because of a well grounded suspicion that the misuses
of estimates of wealth and claims did more harm than their
legitimate uses could outweigh. The long series of official
national wealth estimates, running back to 1850, was not con-
tinued beyond 1922. National income estimates, which had
barely started before World War I, became more and more
fashionable through the 'twenties and 'thirties; and interest in
them displaced interest in wealth.
The 1948 meeting of the Conference testified to a reverse
swing. Wealth estimation is becoming more respectable and
drawing more resources—primarily because we entered the
postwar period with a backlog of needs for wealth estimates—
needs that went largely unrecognized in the 1930's. These
needs are genuine, and the upswing of wealth estimation is
deserved. But our previous skepticism had good grounds; and
if we forget those grounds for skepticism, much of our work is
to go to waste.
2Misuses of Wealth and Claims Estimates
Time was when wealth estimates were the crown of economic
statistics. In the absence of income measurements, they offered
the best yardstick against which to measure quantities. In a
less urbanized society, moreover, people may have thought of
their affairs more in terms of wealth than income. Wealth is a
more natural focus of attention (and income less natural) for
a farmer than for a wage earner.
These early uses for wealth estimates faded as society
changed and as income figures became available. But the mis-
uses went merrily on. Wealth estimates gave a certain concrete-
ness to the superficial analogies between public and private
affairs that make so much trouble in the social sciences. Nota-
bly, forebodings of cnational bankruptcy' were based upon
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comparisons of wealth with national debt. A variation on the
theme was comparison of wealth with 'total debt, public and
private', or with 'liquid claims'. National wealth has figured
also in the arguments of people eager to scuttle American help
to Europe by blowing upon fears of the 'exhaustion of Ameri-
can resources'.
3The Backlog of Uses
Meanwhile, we have discovered a long list of new uses for facts
about national wealth and the claims upon it. The wartime
accumulation of liquid assets and of 'backlogs of demand' has
reminded us that we need to know how current operations of
firms and households are influenced by the composition of
their assets and liabilities. The gaps in our theories of invest-
ment force a search for dependable quantitative relationships
linking investment with the stock of capital assets, the flow of
output, and financial conditions. With rising interest in the
public debt, it is not enough to throw epithets at people who
say our debt threatens bankruptcy: economists have to pro-
duce down-to-earth explanations of the sense in which internal
debt 'cancels out'—not ignoring the qualifications.
Applied economics thus bristles with questions for which
we need information on wealth and claims. Speaking as a theo-
rist, I hope that we are ready to correct the over-emphasis of
interwar theories on flows by working out the interrelations
of flows with stocks—a wealth problem.
0
4Mechanical vs. Motivating Relationships
When we look at the relationship between the wealth-claims
structure and the current flow of activity, we see two types of
connection. These I shall call mechanical and motivating.
A mechanical relationship arises simply from the fact that
many flows are in and out of stocks in any of several senses. To
illustrate: (a) A firm's stock of machine parts has inflow from
purchase and from its own fabrication; and outflow from sales,
use in production, and wastage. Net inflow plus initial stock
must equal final stock. (b) A firm's debts payable are increased84 PART I
by new borrowing and interest accrual (inflow) and reduced by
repayments (outflow); net new borrowing plus initial debt
must equal final debt. (c) A firm's backlog of orders grows by
the filing of new orders and shrinks by cancellation and deliv-
ery; net accretion of orders plus initial orders must equal
orders on the books at the end of the period.
These mechanical relationships serve one set of uses for
wealth data. That is, they give us control data for estimating
income. We estimate a few items in the capital-formation
accounts by an inventory method. In more (notably housing)
we have fragmentary evidence on both inventories and flows;
the two rather unreliable sets of data are then a check on
each other.1 Broadly speaking, to give this sort of check on com-
modity flow series we need the physical asset side of wealth
estimation, with standards of valuation attuned to the problem
of filtering out irrelevant price fluctuations. This sort of check
on expenditure data gives us uses for the claims side. The mate-
rials assembled in this cluster of papers on wealth strike me as
on the whole adapted to tracing these mechanical relation-
ships.
The explanatory value of mechanical relationships, though,
is only so-so. In principle, these relationships are characteristics
of the definitions around which we build our accounting sys-
tems. They have the kind of explanatory value we attribute to
the balance-of-payments equation in international trade: since
they are truistical, any statement inconsistent with them must
be false. This sort of truth is a rather useful weeding tool in the
garden of economic doctrine. But it does not get us very far
into the why of things.
Motivating relationships have explanatory value of a higher
sort. They are stated in 'meaningful' propositions, not inevita-
ble in the light of the definitons, and are susceptible to refuta-
tion if research shows the facts are not as pictured.2 By the same
1Anotable example of this sort of control operation is Simon Kuznets' compari-
son of capital formation with the accretion of capital wealth (National Product
since1869.,pp. 193 if.).
2Cf.Paul Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Harvard University
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token, they are very interesting, if true, because of their predic-
tion value. Examples of such interesting-if-true propositions
involving wealth are: (a) firms in industry W will strive to in-
crease inventory whenever it falls below x percent of sales;
(b) the number of new housing units built has an elasticity of
EhV with respect to the vacancy ratio; (c) public utility concerns
will refuse to borrow to expand their plant if their debt ex-
ceeds R times their operating revenue.
In short, the motivating relationships that need study lie in
areas where we have to forecast, cannot forecast without a
theory, and cannot theorize without factual data.
5Aggregates vs. Component Estimates
The misuses of wealth estimates about which I complained
above are misuses of 'global' figures. They arise when we are so
rash as to publicize aggregate figures of wealth or debt.
The legitimate uses of wealth estimates depend upon the
components of the wealth-and-claims structures and their in-
terrelations. If we could fill in the master tables (Exhibits I and
H) set up for this project—and now largely blank—the most use-
ful figures would be those inside, in the cells. Uses for line
totals and column totals would be few. As for the figure appear-
ing in the southwest corner where line and column totals are
added, it is there only to verify the arithmetic of the line and
column additions; its logical force lies in the check-mark which
certifies you get the same figure whether you add across or
down, not in the figure itself.
The kind of 'structure' varies somewhat from use to use. For
tracing mechanical relationships to control our income figures
or fill gaps, type-of-asset classification is what we chiefly need.
For the motivating relationships, though, we need type-of-
holder (or type-of-debtor) classification. This classification has
been and remains very thin—a testimonial to inadequate analy-
sis of wealth in the past, and a handicap to its analysis in the
future.86 PARTI
BTHE STRUCTURE OF AND ECONOMIC MOTIVATION
1The Balance Sheet and Motives
The starting point of the motivation approach to the wealth
problem is the balance sheet of the individual firm or house-
hold, as it affects operations. The process of economic change
is always throwing balance sheets out of equilibrium—giving
people motives to take steps to change them. Balance sheets
have low pressure areas into which they suck assets (newly
created or bought from other economic units), as a shortage of
size 15½ shirts on the shelves motivates department store buy-
ing. Balance sheets have high pressure areas from which tI.iey
repel assets, as a household that has recently lost members
has lost also incentives to buy new beds.
From the standpoint of the motivation problem, no classifi-
cation of assets and liabilities is perfect. Liabilities must be
regarded as held for the sake of holding assets—and as influenc-
ing asset structure. Assets may be held: (a) as operating assets,
to help carry out the current operations of the economic unit
(household outfit, industrial plant, goods in process, working
inventory, shares in companies the owner has to control, etc.);
(b) as a source of nonoperating income; (c) speculatively, in the
hope of capital gain; (d) for liquidity. Note that identical assets
may be differently classified by different people. For the C & 0,
New York Central stock is a channel for the exercise of power
—an operating asset; for most holders, asset-holding motives
(b) and (c) predominate. Holdings of spot wheat are an operat-
ing asset to a miller, a speculative asset to a Board of Trade
member. A Treasury certificate is a source of income and of
liquidity to a bank, primarily a source of liquidity to a corpora-
tion with accrued tax liabilities, but a speculative asset to the
Discount Corporation.
The nearest thing to an all purpose classification of balance
sheet items is probably by liquidity. Liabilities have negative
liquidity, shading off from —1 (liquidity of cash =1)for debts
payable tomorrow to a lower coefficient for debts payable 20
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to the liquidity of debts if we could allow properly for fictitious
maturities—where renewal is in substance already provided for.
On the asset side, items of high liquidity and negligible income
(cash) are at one end of the spectrum; at the other end are assets
that are firmly tied into the unit's income- or enjoyment-yield-
ing activity (old clothes; parts of essential machinery). Other as-
sets can be ranged on a scale along which liquidity drops and es-
sentiality to the unit's operation rises. Broadly speaking, if any
event increases a unit's liquidity (or reduces its need for liquid-
ity) the result will be substitution along this scale. But the assets
at the high-essentiality-low-liquidity end are largely the prod-
ucts of capital formation (buildings, machinery, etc.). So such
ashiftstrengthens the market of durable goods producers.
Unfortunately, this is only one dimension of the classifica-
tions we might make. We might classify assets according to the
stability of prices. Highly speculative assets
may slide rather fast along the liquidity-essentiality scale as
speculative attitudes shift. Or we might classify assets by their
speed of attrition under some process we are studying (war, or
depression, or obsolescence through technical progress). Assets
that evaporate quickly are likely to become low pressure sec-
tors of balance sheets and encourage new production.
Any way you look at this classification problem, it is plain
that in principle we need to assemble data in the form of a cross
tabulation table (such as Exhibit 1)—showing assets and claims
by type of both asset and holder (or debtor). Our inability to
fill this table is an index of the thinness of our knowledge.
2Valuation Patterns
From the standpoint of liquidity (or of monetary theory), the
problem of motivating relationships among balance sheet
items turns on current dollar valuations. Comparisons from
time to time or from place to place, as far as I can visualize com-
parisons we may want, can be put in terms of comparisons of
ratios, each ratio being a fraction in which the numerator and
denominator are expressed in dollars of like date.
For operating assets, replacement cost is the most appro-.88 PARTI
priatestandard, for technological progress usually opens op-
tions of replacing with lower cost equipment of equal capacity,
so that replacement of capacity rather than of physical attri-
butes must be the yardstick.3 The reason is that for many
analytical purposes we want to treat increments of operating
assets as percentages of the stock, so that comparability of
valuation between existing and new assets is essential. I ven-
ture the guess that the needs of the mechanical relations and
motivating relations studies will run parallel.
For debts payable, a satisfactory first approximation is face
value. Refinements of valuation lead to puzzles, however. For
one thing, debts receivable are always (and properly) valued
ex an allowance for losses. This implies that in a mechanical-
relations study some corresponding subtraction should be
made from debts payable. In a motivating-relations study, the
situation is different. A debtor who sees default as inevttable
is in a special situation: he has intense motives to 'milk' his
enterprise, and if feasible such debtors should be treated as a
special class. A debtor who sees default as possible but unde-
sirable is in a very different situation: he may have incentives
to 'plunge' speculatively if his default can be avoided only by
some sort of spectacular success, or to be ultra-conservative if
default can clearly be avoided by playing safe but may ensue if
risks are run. Since most defaults are probably not taken into
account far in advance in debtors' calculations, the rough and
ready solution of taking debts payable at face value is probably
not too bad. A second puzzle arises on the side of interest. If
(say) a corporation has chosen to float bonds at a discount rather
than offer a high coupon rate, discounting future repayments
3Omissionof values for human resources of households is not crucial, from the
motivating relations standpoint, because acquisition of additions or replace-
ments is not ordinarily a matter of business calculation in the household.
In thinking of intangible wealth attached to firms, however, human resources
count—as far as groupings have been built up (or are to be built up) on which
the efficiency of the firm depends. The superiority of a going concern over a
mere heap of resources, blueprints, etc. lies in patterns of cooperation, and in
specialized technical knowledge—acquired at a cost, reproducible at a cost, and
recognized as real by the practice of insuring lives of key men for the benefit
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of principal and interest at an interest rate truly relevant to the
firm's calculations will yield a present value of the debt below
the face value. Owing to the prevalence of capital rationing,4
'internal rates' of economic units probably rule a good deal
higher than the rates formally embodied in debt contracts; and
it may be argued that debts payable are overvalued on the
books in consequence. On the other hand, book value as such
must be granted a certain importance in business calculations.
For nonoperating assets, the student of motivating relation-
ships has reason to be interested in market values, book values,
and the spread between them; also (as far as these assets are
debts receivable) in face value if different from book value. An
asset whose market value exceeds its book value may be pre-
sumed to be a good deal more liquid in the eyes of its holder
than an asset whose market value is less than its book value,
especially if the market is below par.5 It must be remembered
that those who decide to acquire, hold, or sell assets are operat-
ing largely with other people's money, and in consequence
have reason to be less concerned with maximum gain for their
clients and more concerned with adherence to convention and
avoidance of actions likely to stir up criticism than those who
operate with their own money. Public emphasis on market
values in these cases tends to keep clients in a nervous state,
as witness the relative situations of investment trusts and life
insurance. Trustees have a special incentive to be conserva-
tive in selecting assets, and to choose the most stable basis of
valuation for their formal accounting—and also for public
explanations and private rationalizations of their policy (which
in turn must have a significant influence on policy itself).
4SecA. C. Hart, Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning (University
of Chicago Press, 1940), Ch. III.
5ona 2.5 percent yield basis, a 3 percent bond selling at a premium is likely to
tic looked upon as much more liquid than a 2 percent bond selling at a discount.
To sell the 2 percent bond at a discount commonly involves giving up hope of
recovery and putting the seal upon a loss—a much more painful process than
giving up hope of a larger premium on the S percent bond.
In important special cases, however, tax incentives may pull the other way.
A security holder who has taxable capital gains in the current tax period may
prefer to select for sale securities on which he can register losses.90 PART I
3Grouping of Units
Obviously there is no way to handle every economic unit
separately. So we must group units in such a way that we can
presume that their situations and their reaction patterns are
somewhat homogeneous. But for the study of motivating rela-
tionships, we should think of ourselves as summarizing the
balance sheets of comparable units, not as grouping the
holders of comparable assets.
These considerations are reflected in the headings of Ex-
hibit I. But the groupings there are internally so heterogene-
ous that our ability to interpret the group aggregates is much
weakened. For example, our column 11 (households) should
in principle be divided in each of several ways:
By terms of occupancy
a) Tenants
b) Owner-occupants with substantial mortgage
c) Owner-occupants without substantial mortgage
By level of wealth or of income
d) Richest 1 percent
e) Rest of richest 5 percent
f) Rest of richest 10 percent
etc.
By type of income
i) Entrepreneurial
j)Self-employedprofessional
k) Wage earners, unionized
1) Wage earners, nonunionized, and clerical
m) Salaried professional and administrative
n) Primarily dependent on property income
o) Retired
p) N.e.c.
By type of property held
q) Proprietors (lli+ llj)
r) Nonentrepreneurial assets
i) Chiefly cash and insurance
ii) The above plus owned homeUSES OF ESTIMATES AND STRUCTURE OF CLAIMS 91
iii) The above plus other real estate and/or stock-ex-
change securities
iv) The above plus securities held with a view to con-
trolling corporations
Within each group, while we are at it, it would be desirable to
build up a picture not only of average positions but of the
dispersion of positions. For instance, we might distribute num-
ber of economic units and amounts of assets with reference to
certain crucial asset-to-operating or asset-to-liability ratios.
The above is utopian. But it is worth stressing how far from
utopian is the classification of our Exhibits—which in turn is
far beyond what we seem able to fill in. Recognizing only
one class of credit institution in Exhibits I and II is in the in-
terest of saving space; it does not reflect lack of hope that we
can find data. In my illustrative claims tabulation below
(Table 1), I have managed to split out four subgroups, and
the figures are among the least flimsy in that table. But busi-
ness subgroups in either Exhibits I and II or Table 1 are too
heterogeneous to make much sense in motivation terms. The
absence of a separate group of real estate concerns is the most
dramatic symptom of this weakness.
As a gauge of the primitive state of our knowledge of wealth,
consider Hicks' modest little Table V in Social Framework of
the American Economy, (p. 134). Of its 18 entries, not includ-
ing subtotals and totals, we could probably fill in 6 for the
United States from the data pulled together for this volume—
with, I presume, about a 10 percent margin of accuracy. I
might be able to guess the rest within 25 percent, but I cannot
guarantee it.
4Effects ofHeterogeneity
In the absence of evidence, it might seem natural to shrug off
all this fuss about the structure of assets and claims versus the
size of the mass of assets. Admitting that in principle we always
learn something from additional detail, is the gain worth while
in this case?
A presumption is easily established that important evidence92 PARTI
is thrown away in the process of 'consolidating' wealth accounts
down to a national aggregate. This presumption rests on the
logic of debt. On the average or in the aggregate there is no
debt, for every debt is both a payable and a receivable, and
must therefore cancel out in the consolidation process. But
everyone knows that debt does not cancel out of people's
thoughts about their wealth position; and it is hard to believe
that debt cancels out as an influence on capital formation and
on the course of prices.
The importance of getting down to fairly homogeneous
groups may be illustrated by a very sketchy analysis of cor-
porate debt figures from Statistics of Income for 1940. Consider
first'all corporations'—excluding those shown in 'finance'
except for the real estate subgroup. Their short term debt
position was roughly in balance. They had receivables of $18.2
billion and payables (accounts payable plus notes etc. maturing
within a year) of $18.4 billion. Besides, they had about $10.7
billion of cash. Thus one would infer that a drop in the price
level would increase their liquidity (as is commonly argued in
monetary discussions) by raising the 'real' value of their cash
and leaving the 'real' value of their net short term debt posi-
tion undisturbed. The general inference is that flexibility of
price levels would have a stabilizing effect on activity, since a
drop would increase investment incentives via this rise in cor-
porate liquidity.6
When we go into details by industrial groups, though, this
inference is shaken. Consider 'public utilities and transporta-
tion'. Here receivables added up to $1.44 billion and payables
due within one year to $2.12 billion, implying net debtorship
of $0.68 billion. In addition, long term debt was so overshadow-
ing ($23.3 billion) that maturities beyond 1 year must be taken
as a serious negative item in liquidity.7 Cash was only $1.85
billion. Prospects of a gain in liquidity in this sector through
6Figuresfor households show them in a position to gain liquidity also by a
decline in the price level.
7Forthe inclusive group of corporations delimited above, long term debt stood
at $42.0 billion, or only about S.9 times cash, as compared with 12.6 times cash
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price decline were thus far from bright. But a large proportion
of the investment opportunity one would hope greater liquid-
ity would uncover lies in this field.
In the real estate sector, even more damage is done to the
general inference. Receivables were $0.94 billion, payables
$1.87 billion, cash $0.41 billion. So debts payable within one
year exceeded receivables plus cash by a margin of $0.52 bil-
lion. Into the bargain, the shadow of long term debt was still
deeper—nearly 22 times cash.8 'Here is another large block of
investment opportunities.
These figures suggest that quite possibly in a deflation the
increase in liquidity is in one set of hands and the access to
investment opportunity in another. This may make quite a
difference to the theory of money and business fluctuations.
But there is no use pursuing these theoretical inferences here.
The point is that we have to look inside the structure of claims
before we can get reliable evidence on the motivating relation-
ships of the balance sheet to operations.
C THE UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT WEALTH
1The Blanks in the Tables
In view of the amount of spade-work on wealth which this
batch of papers embodies, it might be natural to feel we are
well on the way to an adequate knowledge about wealth. But
this examination of the claims side of the wealth picture, and of
the motivating relationships, says that we have barely made a
beginning.
As mentioned above, the blanks in our master tables tell the
story. We have a lot of bits and pieces, but they do not add up
well. If we drew only upon the evidence assembled for this
meeting, we could not fill in the key balance sheet items for
8Thesituation wasslightlybetter for profitable real estate corporations, which
showed cash of $0.23 billion, receivables of $0.39 billion, accounts payable of
$0.33 billion, and other debt maturing within the year of $0.26 billion. Long
term debt stood at about 13.3 times cash. But this is still not a picture of a group
of corporations that stands to gain liquidity from a price decline.94 PART!
morethan one or two major groups. Obviously we cannot
afford to identify this set of reports with the sum of professional
knowledge. At some points various byproducts of Morris Cope-
land's moneyflows study will fill in;at others we can use evi-
dence from Federal Reserve studies of liquid assets; at others
evidence from the National Bureau financial research program.
But even taking all this into account, I still assert the evidence
does not add up.
2Weakness in the Theory of Assets
Part of the responsibility for our sad state of ignorance comes
home to my own field of economic theory. In theory as in
factual research, the interwar period was one of growing pre-
occupation with economic flows to the neglect of the problems
of stocks. It was high time we discovered the income effect, and
its pervasiveness in all the lines of work theorists have lately
taken up (except monopolistic competition, where it is per-
haps underrated), shows that theorists are trying to make up
for lost time. But now it is high time we discovered the balance
sheet effect.
Some work has been done in this direction—notably by
Marschak and Hicks, and on a plane closer to policy lately
by Homer Jones.1° I hope I am making some contribution in
a recent book on money.11 But having tried last year to run a
seminar in this field, and having been forced to prune back
some of the more ambitious growths in the money book, I
have the feeling that we theorists have not yet found the right
way to set this knotty problem up so that we can get our axes
into it.
9 His very illuminating paper below, which fills several gaps I complain of for
a few recent years, was not available when this was drafted.
10 Jacob Marschak, 'Money and the Theory of Assets', Econometrica, Vol. 6
(1938), pp. 811-25; Makower and Marschak, 'Assets, Prices and Monetary The.
ory', Economica (New Series, V, 1938), pp. 261-88; J. R. Hicks, 'A Suggestion for
Simplifying the Theory of Money', Economica (New Series, II, 1935), pp. 1-19;
Value and Capital (Oxford University Press, 1939), passim; Homer Jones, 'Invest-
ment Prospects', Journal of Finance, Vol. 2 (1947), pp. 15-33.
11 A. G. Hart, Money, Debt and Economic Activity (Prentice-Hall, 1948),
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3Lack of Evidence on Motivation
1 venture the guess that much of our trouble in this field springs
from trying to theorize without enough evidence how motives
actually tie together. We have little systematic knowledge how
business men and consumers frame their estimates of the
future. We have little systematic knowledge what happens
when there are strategic changes in business plans—who is
called in conclave, what evidence is pulled together, what
arguments are given weight.
The time is ripe for trying to assemble and systematize a lot
of interview information on business and household decisions.
There seem to be several exploratory studies going on, and
procedures for getting this sort of information have improved
greatly in the last decade or so. But it will clearly be some years
before economic theory (and thus the terms of reference of
factual inquiries) can get the full benefit of such studies.'2
4Need for an Economic-Unit Focus
Having just filed what amounts to a petition-in-bankruptcy on
behalf of economic theory, I may be in a poor position to sug-
gest redirection of research. Yet I think some rather elementary
theoretical considerations can help us stumble forward.
The starting point of theoretical inquiry is the notion that
economic events are things done on behalf of economic units
(households and firms). The post-Marshallian reorganization
of economic theory rests upon the insight that forces affecting
private operations must act via the decision-making of these
units. Thus we can never go wrong in taking these units as a
focus of analysis.
The inference for wealth studies is that we need mono-
graphic treatment of the wealth position of various classes of
economic units, and its role in their operations. For some areas
(especially banking, life insurance, transportation, and manu-
facturing), we have prefabricated source book material that
12Onthis problem of evidence see my Liquidity and Investment', American
Economic Review, Supplement, May 1949,96 PART I
makes it fairly easy to build up a rough picture. At the other
extreme, we have only fragmentary evidence on the wealth
position of private households (especially on the dispersion of
such positions), and on the position of unincorporated busi-
ness. In both these fields there is room for exploratory studies
devoted to piecing together this fragmentary evidence.'3 Even
more urgent, though, is the invention of ways to get certain
key pieces of evidence to fill gaps.
If there is to be a fresh set of assignments on wealth under the
Conference, I would like to urge that they should divide the
field by type of economic unit rather than by type of asset, and
aim to yield balance sheets for each main type such as we now
have for agriculture and for banking. If the Conference decides
to adjourn its wealth inquiries to more favorable times, I
would like to urge that individual workers try to work on the
weakest type of unit areas (households and unincorporated
business) as a contribution to hastening those more favorable
times.
D THE STRUCTURE OF CLAIMS
The information on national wealth assembled for this volume
is designed primarily to yield an inventory of physical assets in
the United States. An inventory of claims upon wealth is sup-
posed to arise as a byproduct.
I have already voiced my protest against this way of looking
at things. The central point is simply that our inquiry was not
designed so that it could yield the desired byproduct, since it
was organized by types of assets rather than by types of eco-
nomic units holding the assets. According to forecast, our
inquiry has in fact not yielded an inventory of claims. Specif-
ically, only the papers of Copeland, Burroughs, Kosh, and
Sammons provide figures in usable form that go beyond those
13Myexperience ten years ago in working out De&ts and Recovery (Twentieth
Century Fund, 1938) convinced me that ingenuity applied to these fragments
could do a good deal—and could focus the uncertainties on a few crucial ques-
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availablein print, and Kosh's happen to be only for 1946—a
year for which other data are still fragmentary. Any gesture at
filling in the forms we optimistically called 'Exhibits' I and II
would be quite futile.
Could a rough picture of the structure of claims be pieced
together from outside sources? At some risk to my professional
reputation, I have attempted a sketch (Table 1) of claims exist-
ing in 1939. Some of the figures have direct evidence behind
them; others are strongly indicated by fairly rigorous pro-
cedures of subtraction and cross-comparison; some are rank
guesses. The only merit I can claim for the table factually is
that I have tried to avoid contradicting known facts. Ana-
lytically, it has the merit of showing what kind of thing we
would know if we put resources into a well coordinated study
of claims; this is its real justification.
1Transactor Groups
In building a brick house without clay in this fashion, it is
essential to keep the structure simple. So I have pared down
the number of transactor groups to (or perhaps past) the
irreducible minimum. Working from right to left in the head-
ings of the table, I have recognized two groups of 'ultimate'
holders of wealth. Households must obviously be included.
But since the wealth of governments and of private collectives
(universities; mutual associations in respect of their unappor-
tioned surplus) is not allocated to specific households, they
also have to appear as ultimates; here they are lumped to-
gether.14 If we included, besides claims, an inventory of the
physical assets owned by each transactor group, the total of
such assets directly owned by ultimates plus net claims owned
by ultimates would be the total of national wealth. All other
transactor groups are treated as 'intermediaries', through
claims upon which physical assets are indirectly owned by
i.iltimates.
14 By a useful if artificial convention I have treated mutual life insurance com-
panies, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associations as credit insti-
tutions but carried their equity over as an asset of a (fictitious) collective.98 PART I
The intermediaries are split into two major groups. Credit
institutions are organizations that deal almost entirely in
debt claims—physical assets and equity claims being incidental.
The main subgroups are banks and life insurance companies.
'Other private credit institutions' include savings and loan
associations, brokers, installment finance houses, etc. (Insur-
ance other than life is treated as 'business' in the narrower
sense.) For clarity, government 'corporations and credit agen-
cies' are split off and treated here; the government's debt claims
against them and 'net proprietary interest' are carried over to
government in the 'ultimates' column. (Taxes accrued but
unpaid, etc. are treated as assets of 'governments and private
collectives'.) The Federal Reserve is treated as a government
credit agency.
The domestic business group is split only three ways—cor-
porations, farms, and noncorporate enterprise. The 'rest of
the world' is treated as a business subgroup; a case could be
made for setting it up as a major group rather than a subgroup,
but this would complicate the table.
The 'gross total' figures which ornament the top line and
left columns are mere operators with little analytical signifi-
cance of their own. The more significant totals are the 'net'
figures at the bottom of the main sections of the table and the
'total ultimates' figures at the right.
2Table Layout
The table is laid out in four parts—cash and short term debt
claims, long term debt claims, equity claims, and net claims. In
each, the column headings are for major and minor transactor
groups. In each of the first three, the stub is also for transactor
groups. Thus the table is a cross-tabulation (with 'stuffings'
which measure amounts of claims in billions of current dol.
lars).
This cross-tabulation form is intended to help crystallize the
concept of 'structure' in claims. It emphasizes the two-ended
nature of a claim, and shows balance sheets of individual trans-
actor as line and column crosses in a claims matrix. ItUSES OF ESTIMATES AND STRUCTURE OF CLAIMS 99
is helpful also for the detective work involved in research. Since
each claim has two ends, it can always be found on two balance
sheets. Estimates from both can be compared and figures from
one balance sheet adjusted by figures from the other. As long
as we lack direct evidence on balance sheets of individuals, we
are slaves to residual estimation for many key figures; and here
the rigidity of the cross-tabulation aids in guessing shrewdly.
Once we have data, sorting out balance sheets for separate
groups will be helpful for further analysis. Furthermore, in
view of differing motivation patterns, evidence can often be
better presented with somewhat diverging balance sheet forms.
But for fact finding, standardized forms and a cross-tabulation
are essential—their absence is one reason for our poor success
on the claims side in this study.
3The Short Term Structure
In the short term section of the table, two monetary accounts
appear on the debtor stub, without corresponding spaces in
the creditor heading. This gives monetary gold and silver
stocks a chance to come into the national wealth; and of course
it brings cash plus receivables out above payables. Gold cer-
tificates are taken as evidence of Federal Reserve ownership
of gold rather than as Treasury debts; but 'Treasury currency'
and Federal Reserve Notes are treated (line M2) as debts for
the issuers.
In the business columns a substantial short term creditor-
ship appears, owing chiefly to the inclusion of cash (lines M2
and Cl) among receivables. Noncash receivables for business
roughly canceled short term debts payable. For corporations
n.e.c., short term payables were roughly $29 billion and re-
ceivables $30 billion. On the other hand, these figures (based
on Statistics of Income, excluding banking, etc.) presumably
overstate receivables relative to payables and to cash, because
of transit items debtors have charged off from both payables
and cash but creditors have not yet transferred from receivables
to cash.
Credit institutions appear as substantial short term debtors100 PARTI
because virtually all their liabilities (deposits, insurance cash
values, savings and loan redeemable shares) are short term,
while bonds and mortgages loom large among their assets.
Households also appear as heavy net creditors, but only in
virtue of cash assets. Better accounting for accrued wages and
salaries, etc. would add to their apparent receivables; but not
enough to outweigh installment debts, etc.
4The Long Term Debt Structure
In the long term section, the monetary debtor accounts are
missing. Besides, the credit institutions appear only as credi-
tors. Business and government show up as net debtors; house-
holds (thanks to their holdings of bonds) as net creditors.
Here even more than in the short term table we miss infor-
mation on finer subgroups. Surely many households as of 1939
must have been net debtors on long term account because of
mortgages. And as already noted, real estate and utility cor-
porations were heavy net debtors (besides being smaller net
debtors on short term). The transactor group classification is
too coarse for much use.
5The Equity Structure
Almost by definition, the equity structure has to be curiously
tilted. As business and credit institutions are not self-owning,
their equities end up in the ultimates columns. Almost all the
equity claims of households of course arise in 'business'.
Here we are particularly at a loss for information on what
Mr. Goldsmith calls the 'valuation difference'. In the debt
accounts, our chief worry is about the creditor's reserves for
bad debts; though there are interesting puzzles about fluctua-
tions in the market value of bonds. But in the equity accounts
the market value of stocks is of the essence. The table is based
on book values of concerns valued (Statistics of Income,
chiefly). We might well lay out another table in the same form
and stuff its cells with valuation differences instead of book
values. But where are we to go for data?USES OF ESTIMATES AND STRUCTURE OF CLAIMS 101
6 Minimum Requirements of Wealth Estimates
A calculation of the sort just outlined, somewhat refined, could
serve the purpose of the Hicks-Campion table. A series of such
jobs for individual years could be the basis for some interpreta-
tion. A claims table can probably be worked out annually from
1928 onward—with a moderate improvement of data begin-
fling during the war. If a physical assets table to match could
also be worked out annually, we could get some clue to the
shift of economic motives resulting from the cumulative effect
of transactions, and from (beziehungsweise reflected in) re-
valuations of assets and claims. Unfortunately, an annual series
of physical assets data may be hard to get.
The amount of interpretation one can base on this sort of
table, though, depends on further cross-classification to in-
crease the number of transactor groups. This will involve a
curious sort of cut-and-try in using the cross-tab, since the
borders of the table can be cross-classified more finely than the
stuffings, and some of the stuffings data are lumpy.
7Research Agenda for Claims
If we aim to get an adequate analysis of national wealth, as I
pointed out above, we need further research on the claims
side. Here is a list of specific projects that need working:
Credit institutions. Compilation of credit institution balance
sheets set up to fit national wealth accounts, annually, with
special regard to who holds the other end of the claim string
(so as to facilitate use of bank, insurance, etc. data to fill in
balance sheets of other transactor groups). Differences between
bank book value and value on the books at the other end of
the string may prove measurable.
Corporations. A similar job for corporations by major groups,
using Statistics of Income supplemented by SEC data, Standard
Statistics estimates, market values of shares, etc. Utilities and
credit institutions should be pulled out of the Statistics of
Income compilations and figures from direct sources put back









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































UnincorporatedNon farm Business. Shrewd guesses may be
made from sample data at the National Bureau of Economic
Research and Dun and Bradstreet.
Households, Trust Accounts, etc. While data are fragmentary,
it would pay to array them and see how near they come to giv-
ing information (capitalized income tax data, trust account
data, etc. are samples of the fragments).